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TOO MUCH NEURAL REUSE, EVEN FOR
A METAPHORICAL BRAIN
Conceptual mappings are correspon-
dances between conceptual domains
(SPACE, TIME, FORCE, EMOTION, etc.)
or between entities within the same con-
ceptual domain. Through mapping, we
project inferences, elements, and rela-
tions from one mental configuration to
another. Sets of mappings can become
entrenched, creating powerful cognitive
habits. For example, across many cultures
around the world, temporal relations are
conceived by means of spatial relations,
in language (“Saturday is almost here”),
artifacts (timelines, calendars, sundials),
or gesture (Núñez and Sweetser, 2006).
Some of the mappings for this template
are: duration is spatial extent, events are
landmarks, or time is motion along a path.
From over 30 years of conceptual map-
pings research emerges a picture of the
conceptual system as a set of mapping
habits. Instead of a static repository of
concepts, we have a dynamic network
connecting mental structures. Mapping
is not exceptional: it is the norm. It
is through mapping that concepts are
formed, learned, and developed creatively.
These ideas have boosted the interest in the
most remarkable manifestations of map-
ping in language and thought: metaphor,
metonymy, analogy, counterfactuals, etc.
Metaphor has received far more atten-
tion than all the other phenomena
combined. Researchers in Conceptual
Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993), have identi-
fied many sets of cross-domain mappings
underlying conventional metaphorical
expressions: TIME IS SPACE, LIFE IS A
JOURNEY, ANGER IS HEAT, EVENTS ARE
ACTIONS, etc. According to CMT, concep-
tual metaphors are static, ontological, fixed
sets of partial correspondances between
two conceptual domains. Metaphor trans-
fers inferences from the source domain,
more concrete or better structured, to the
target domain, which is more abstract or
less delineated. A system of thousands of
metaphorical mappings constitutes the
main mechanism for abstract thought in
the human mind.
From the nineties, the semantic pos-
tulates of CMT have been used to
develop the Neural Theory of Language
(NTL) (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Feldman,
2008; Lakoff, 2008). In NTL, concep-
tual metaphors are replaced by neural
mappings, combinations of simple neural
circuits that carry out conceptual map-
pings. The major function of all this neu-
ral binding is the reuse of sensorimotor
brain mechanisms for new roles in lan-
guage and reasoning. This is congenial
with the grounding of abstract concepts
in perceptual experience (Barsalou, 1999,
2008), called embodiment in conceptual
mappings research (Johnson, 1987, 2008;
Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).
The overarching idea of CMT-NTL is
a “metaphorical mind-brain,” based on
direct, binary transfer across domains. The
transfer is carried out through static cog-
nitive habits, which are implemented by
neural circuitry connecting pairs of brain
areas. For the brain, metaphor is once
more privileged over all other manifes-
tations of mapping, just like it was for
the mind. A good example of the rapidly
growing interest in the neuroscience of
metaphor is the Frontiers issue about the
topic, currently being edited by Vicky T.
Lai and Seana Coulson.
But the metaphorical brain seems quite
insufficient to account for the perva-
siveness and complexity of neural reuse.
In a recent BBS target article, Michael
Anderson (2010) shows that what is going
on in the brain dwarfs the predictions of
embodiment or CMT-NTL. Statistics run
on thousands of fMRI studies indicate that
even fairly small brain regions are typically
reused in multiple tasks, with even higher
reuse probabilities if a region is involved
in perception or action (Anderson et al.,
2010).
Neural reuse is ubiquitous and
dynamic, and many of its results cannot
be explained as domain-structuring inher-
itance. Anderson examines, among others,
the following examples: the SNARC effect
(a mental number line with magnitudes
increasing from left to right), the corre-
lation between finger representation and
numerical cognition, the interaction of
word and gesture, or the phonological
loop in working memory. These cases
present no metaphorical projection, and
some of them involve more than two com-
ponents. Rather than direct transfer of
information, a given system seems to be
reused for a non-primary purpose because
it happens to have a function or structure
that are appropriate for the particular cog-
nitive task at hand. As Anderson claims, we
need a broader theoretical framework, able
to account for those individual phenom-
ena as well as for the general prevalence of
neural reuse.
FROM TRANSFER TO EMERGENCE: THE
NETWORK MODEL OF CONCEPTUAL
INTEGRATION
Can conceptual mappings research pro-
vide such a framework? For one thing,
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the CMT-NTL model is certainly not
the only one in the field. CMT and
the pervasiveness of mapping were the
point of departure of Gilles Fauconnier’s
Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier, 1985,
1997), later developed by Fauconnier and
Mark Turner into Conceptual Integration
Theory, or Blending Theory (BT) (Turner,
1996, 2014; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).
Beyond the common ground with
CMT (Fauconnier and Lakoff, 2013), BT
introduces significant innovations. Mental
spaces are not vast domains such as TIME
or SPACE, but small conceptual packets
that flexibly combine entrenched struc-
tures and contextual information, for local
purposes of thought and action. Mappings
are established through structural or func-
tional correspondances between input
spaces in a generic mental space. The
participation of more than two inputs is
quite typical. Selectively projected to a
blended space or conceptual blend, ele-
ments from the inputs interact, typically
producing emergent structure, which can-
not be accounted for by direct trans-
fer between domains. Inferences can take
place in the blend, but also be projected
back to the inputs, which can be modified
as the process unfolds. The mappings, the
emergence of novel structure, the adjust-
ment of the inputs, and everything else
going on is guided by universal governing
principles and competing optimality prin-
ciples, by the functional requirements of
the particular network of mental spaces,
dictated by context and goals, and by the
creativity of the individual or group who
are striving to make the most of it all.
The overarching picture that results
from BT bears important differences with
that of CMT-NTL. Advanced blending
underlies all manifestations of mapping,
including metaphor, which is just one
more surface product of this species-
defining capacity for integrating disparate
mental components into new, meaning-
ful wholes. The human brain is a bub-
ble chamber of mental spaces, constantly
building new integration networks, and
a culture is an even larger bubble cham-
ber (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002, p.
321–322). Just like evolution—and neu-
ral reuse—, blending is opportunistic: it
reuses whatever is functionally suitable,
right there and then. As it happens with
the natural selection of living organisms,
the process of trial and error in conceptual
and neural reuse never stops. Through it,
minds and cultures select the few integra-
tions that are really useful, anchor them
bymeans of symbolic procedures, and pass
them on to the next generation. To become
productive habits, both generic templates
of conceptual integration and patterns of
neural reuse need to find an adequate
niche within the general system (about
the notion of neural niche, see: Anderson,
2010, and the commentary by Atsushi Iriki
therein; Iriki and Sakura, 2008; Iriki and
Taoka, 2012).
ONE EXAMPLE: OPPORTUNISTIC
REUSE IN THE NUMBER LINE AND THE
TIMELINE
In blending as in neural reuse, a given
item, once identified as potentially useful,
is integrated into the network under con-
struction. If necessary and possible, the
item is adjusted for optimization in its
new function. If it works, the item is kept
in the network, although it still remains
available for its older functions. Networks
and their components are discarded and
entrenched in a dynamic, extremely agile
process. What is going on here is not
direct transfer of structure, but rather the
construction of a new whole with old
pieces. The novel properties are not bor-
rowed from the structures being reused,
but result from their performance in a new
network.
Among other examples, Anderson
(2010) illustrates this with the spatial-
numerical association of response codes
(SNARC) effect, that is, a mental num-
ber line in which numerals are arrayed
from left to right, in order of increas-
ing magnitude (Dehaene et al., 1993). As
Anderson explains, there is no metaphoric
mapping or perceptual grounding here:
in sensorimotor experience, magnitude
may increase with height (the MORE IS UP
metaphor), but not laterally, and certainly
not in the direction of writing. Numerals
do not inherit the structure of the spa-
tial shifting mechanism: the left-to-right
line has been picked opportunistically, and
integrated with numeral magnitude, sim-
ply because the resulting blend meets the
requirements of the task. We could add
to Anderson’s argument by pointing out
that the mental number line, as a sym-
bolic device, needed considerable cultural
time to emerge: it was only invented in
seventeenth-century Europe, although
awareness of potential correspondances
between numbers and spatial relations
dates back to Babylon (Núñez, 2009). It
took thousands of years for the pattern
to find an appropriate niche, alongside a
representational format that would ensure
its transmission.
The number line is what gets called
a material anchor for a conceptual blend
(Hutchins, 2005). A perceptual structure is
used as an input in the integration process.
In the blend, perceptual relations are fused
with conceptual relations. Now consider a
very similar case. Varied psycholinguistic
evidence shows that processing temporal
expressions causes the automatic activa-
tion of a mental timeline, also running
from left to right in cultures with that writ-
ing system (Torralbo et al., 2006; Weger
and Pratt, 2008; Santiago et al., 2010).
Blending theorists have revised the TIME
IS SPACE metaphor, and shown that it is a
complex network that produces a motion
scene with special rules and constraints,
designed to facilitate the representation of
time: all observers are on the same spot,
all objects move along the same path, and
spatial relations can even be modified by
the emotional attitude of the observer:
“Monday is almost here, but Friday is so
far away” (Fauconnier and Turner, 2008).
The straight line is particularly useful for
anchoring this blended scene. The result is
a graphic representation with novel prop-
erties, which allow us to see diachrony at
a glance, to divide it easily into periods, to
represent events as dots, etc.
The timeline is a generic integration
template that blends at least four inputs:
time and time measures, spatial extent,
objects, and events (Coulson and Cánovas,
2013). Spatial shifting from left to right is
absent from all these components, but it
happens to facilitate the task immensely,
and thus it is imported to the blend, for
local purposes. The pattern is not func-
tional as a metaphor in language, where
past and future are not on the left or right,
but it is extremely productive in gesture
(Casasanto and Jasmin, 2012), where the
lateral axis is more easily available. Again,
the timeline has a long history of failed cul-
tural representations behind it (Rosenberg
and Grafton, 2010), but, once the blending
template found its niche, it is reused time
and again, and can even be adapted for
representing complex emotions and creat-
ing sophisticated poetic effects (Cánovas
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and Jensen, 2013). Metaphor is useful, but
not enough to understand the timeline: a
broader framework of reuse and integra-
tion is needed.
WHAT KIND OF MODEL WE NEED
BT researchers have indeed identified
many recurrent patterns and theorized
about them, but we still lack a gen-
eral framework for generic integration
templates (some work along those lines:
Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Fauconnier,
2009; Cánovas, 2010, 2011; Turner, 2014).
A fruitful interaction with research on
neural reuse can impose further con-
straints and requisites than those observed
in the semantic or semiotic analyses. A
model of conceptual mapping habits fully
compatible with neural reuse may include
the following:
• Network thinking (Mitchell, 2006)
rather than direct binary transfer.
• Flexibility in the activation, selection,
and integration of conceptual and neu-
ral patterns.
• Focus on emergence.
• Emphasis on competing optimal-
ity principles, e.g., a left-to-right
straight line leaves aside many relevant
aspects of time or magnitude, but its
functionality is privileged.
• Detailed examination of how context
and goals, including cultural diachrony,
shape the process of integration.
• A model of entrenchment not based
on ontological projection, but on the
idea of “attaining a niche” through
instance-based learning and context-
sensitive usage.
REFERENCES
Anderson, M. L. (2010). Neural reuse: a funda-
mental organizational principle of the brain
michael. Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 1–69. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X10000853
Anderson, M. L., Brumbaugh, J., and Aysu S¸uben,
A. (2010). “Investigating functional cooperation
in the human brain using simple graph-theoretic
methods,” in Computational Neuroscience,
(Springer) 31–42. doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-88630-
5_2. Available online at: http://link.springer.
com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-88630-5_2
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems.
Behav. Brain Sci. 22, 577–660. doi: 10.1017/
S0140525X99002149
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 59, 617–645. doi: 10.1146/annurev.
psych.59.103006.093639
Cánovas, C. P. (2010). Erotic emissions in greek
poetry: a generic integration network. Cogn.
Semiotics 6, 7–32. doi: 10.3726/81610_7
Cánovas, C. P. (2011). The genesis of the arrows of
love: diachronic conceptual integration in greek
mythology. Am. J. Philol. 132, 553–579. doi:
10.1353/ajp.2011.0044
Cánovas, C. P., and Jensen, M. F. (2013). Anchoring
time-space mappings and their emotions: the
timeline blend in poetic metaphors. Lang. Lit. 22,
45–59. doi: 10.1177/0963947012469751
Casasanto, D., and Jasmin, K. (2012). The Hands
of Time: Temporal Gestures in English Speakers.
Available online at: www.degruyter.com/view/
j/cog.2012.23.issue-4/cog-2012-0020/cog-2012-00
20/cog-2012-0020.xml
Coulson, S., and Cánovas, C. P. (2013). Understanding
timelines. J. Cogn. Semiotics 5, 198–219. doi:
10.1515/cogsem.2013.5.12.198
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., and Giraux, P. (1993). The
mental representation of parity and number mag-
nitude. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 122, 371–396. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.122.3.371
Fauconnier, G. (1985). Mental Spaces: Aspects of
Meaning Construction in Natural Language.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Fauconnier, G. (1997). Mappings in Thought and
Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO978113914220
Fauconnier, G. (2009). Generalized integration net-
works. New Dir. Cogn. Linguist. 147–160.
Fauconnier, G., and Lakoff, G. (2013). On metaphor
and blending. Cogn. Semiotics 5, 393–399.
Fauconnier, G., and Turner, M. (2002). The Way
We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s
Hidden Complexities. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Fauconnier, G., and Turner, M. (2008). “Rethinking
metaphor,” in The Cambridge Handbook
of Metaphor and Thought, ed R. W Gibbs
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press),
57–66. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511816802.005
Feldman, J. A. (2008). From Molecule to Metaphor: A
Neural Theory of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Gallese, V., and Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain’s con-
cepts: the role of the sensory-motor system in
conceptual knowledge. Cogn. Neuropsychol.
22, 455–479. doi: 10.1080/026432904420
00310
Hutchins, E. (2005). Material anchors for concep-
tual blends. J. Pragmatics 37, 1555–1577. doi:
10.1016/j.pragma.2004.06.008
Iriki, A., and Sakura, O. (2008). The neuroscience
of primate intellectual evolution: natural selection
and passive and intentional niche construction.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 363, 2229–2241.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.2274
Iriki, A., and Taoka, M. (2012). Triadic (ecological,
Neural, Cognitive) niche construction: a scenario
of human brain evolution extrapolating tool use
and language from the control of reaching actions.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 367, 10–23. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2011.0190
Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The
Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason.
Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.
Johnson, M. (2008). The Meaning of the Body:
Aesthetics of Human Understanding. Reprint.
Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G. (1987).Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things.
1997th Edn. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago
Press.
Lakoff, G. (1993). “The contemporary theory of
metaphor.” inMetaphor and Thought, ed A. Ortony
(Cambridge, CA: Cambridge University Press).
doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139173865.013
Lakoff, G. (2008). “The neural theory of metaphor.”
in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor
and Thought, ed R. W Gibbs, Jr (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 17–38. doi: 10.1017/
CBO9780511816802.003
Lakoff, G., and Johnson,M. (1980).MetaphorsWe Live
By. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the
Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge
to Western Thought. New York, NY: Basic
Books.
Mitchell, M. (2006). Complex systems: network
thinking. Artif. Intell. 170, 1194–1212. doi:
10.1016/j.artint.2006.10.002
Núñez, R. (2009). Numbers and arithmetic: neither
hardwired nor out there. Biol. Theory 4, 68–83. doi:
10.1162/biot.2009.4.1.68
Núñez, R. E., and Sweetser, E. (2006). With the future
behind them: convergent evidence from aymara
language and gesture in the crosslinguistic com-
parison of spatial construals of time. Cogn. Sci. 30,
401–450. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_62
Rosenberg, D., and Grafton, A. (2010). Cartographies
of Time: A History of the Timeline. New York, NY:
Princeton Architectural Press.
Santiago, J., Román, A., Ouellet, M., Rodríguez, N.,
and Pérez-Azor, P. (2010). In hindsight, life flows
from left to right. Psychol. Res. 74, 59–70. doi:
10.1007/s00426-008-0220-0
Torralbo, A., Santiago, J., and Lupiáñez, J. (2006).
Flexible conceptual projection of time onto spa-
tial frames of reference.Cogn. Sci. 30, 745–757. doi:
10.1207/s15516709cog0000_67
Turner, M. (1996). The Literary Mind: The Origins
of Thought and Language. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Turner, M. (2014). The Origin of Ideas: Blending,
Creativity, and the Human Spark. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Weger, U. W., and Pratt, J. (2008). Time flies like an
arrow: space-time compatibility effects suggest the
use of a mental timeline. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 15,
426–430. doi: 10.3758/PBR.15.2.426
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of
interest.
Received: 27 March 2014; accepted: 09 April 2014;
published online: 29 April 2014.
Citation: Cánovas CP and Manzanares JV (2014)
Conceptual mappings and neural reuse. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 8:261. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00261
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Cánovas and Manzanares. This is
an open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is per-
mitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 261 | 3
